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In entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD), the generation and de-
tection of multi-photon modes leads to a trade-off between entanglement visibility
and two-fold coincidence events when maximizing the secure key rate (SKR). We
produce a predictive model for the optimal two-fold coincidence probability per co-
incidence window given the channel efficiency and detector dark count rate of a given
system. This model is experimentally validated and used in simulations for QKD
with satellites as well as optical fibers.
Introduction
In entanglement-based QKD a choice
must be made between increasing the rate
of pair generation to increase the key rate,
or decreasing the rate of pair production to
decrease the error rate [1]. The total loss an
entanglement-based QKD system can toler-
ate, and thus the longest transmission dis-
tance attainable, is limited by the rate of pair
generation as well as detector characteristics
and error rate.
The photon pair production rate of other
experimental set-ups have optimized using
numerical simulations [1–4]. In other cases,
a few different pump powers are attempted
before settling on the observed power with
the best visibility [5–8]. Some experiments
are limited by classical communication be-
tween detectors, and so the two-fold coinci-
dence rate is optimized for the processing of
detection events [9, 10].
Ma, Feng and Lo [11] found a numeric
solution for optimal squeezing parameter
∗Electronic address: c2hollow@iqc.ca
for QKD with entanglement using SPDC
sources, but it requires root finding and pro-
duces negative values for certain channel ef-
ficiencies. Although the two-fold coincidence
rate can be easily measured, the squeezing
parameter is unmeasurable in practice, be-
cause the channel efficiency, dark count rate,
and multi-order photon terms taint the mea-
surement. We provide a practically useful,
predictive model for the optimal two-fold co-
incidence rates. Such a model must oper-
ate with realistic bucket detectors and dark
counts, and must require as input and pro-
duce as output only variables that are easily
experimentally measureable. This model will
help optimize QKD systems in real-time, and
provides insights into the maximum possible
distance and bit rate of entanglement-based
QKD. We are able to produce this model by
eschewing first-principles modeling in favor of
a symbolic regression approach.
Background
Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle to ensure se-
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2cure key distribution protected from eaves-
dropping in an information theoretic secure
manner[12].
QKD involves one party (Alice) sending
quantum states (e.g. polarized photons) to
a second party (Bob) [13].The system’s secu-
rity depends upon the non-orthogonal com-
plementary bases used to measure the quan-
tum states. If Bob, or an eavesdropper, mea-
sures in a basis other than the one Alice used
to prepare her state, his measurement will be
random noise. If an eavesdropper measures
in the wrong basis, they will introduce de-
tectable errors in Bobs measurement results,
allowing Alice and Bob to abort key genera-
tion before any secrets are shared.
An example implementation of QKD in-
volves generating polarization correlated en-
tangled photon pairs with Alice and Bob
measuring a photon from each pair in one of
two random bases [14]. Alice and Bob mea-
sure a shared source of entangled photons in
random bases. The key is formed from the
results in which Alice and Bob measured in
the same basis. In this paper, we call the
coincidence rate the number of times per sec-
ond where one of Alice’s and one of Bob’s
detectors click within the same time window.
In the implementation described above,
entangled photon states are created using
two sources of pairs of polarization-correlated
photons created by spontaneous parametric
down-conversion (SPDC) in nonlinear mate-
rial. These pairs can be made indistinguish-
able either by using a Sagnac interferome-
ter loop [15], by selecting overlapping spatial
modes in Type-II SPDC processes [16], or by
stacking two nonlinear materials at orthogo-
nal angles (known as sandwich sources) [17].
While it is photon pairs that make the de-
sired entangled states, SPDC produces un-
wanted higher order photon states as well.
More than one photon can be detected by Al-
ice or Bob during the same timing window.
If two orthogonal detectors click, the result
must be assigned to a random result for se-
curity reasons [18], as depicted in fig. 3. In
QKD protocols, the more errors there are in
a sifted key, the more of the sifted key needs
to be revealed, and thus rendered useless, in
order to perform error correction and privacy
amplification.
Simulation
Our simulation is written in Python using
the QuTIP Quantum Toolbox in Python [19]
1. We use a fock state representation follow-
ing Jennewein et al. [20] and the mathemati-
cal description of SPDC and bucket detectors
from Kok et al. [21]. The secure key rate is
calculated using the QBER and two-fold co-
incidence probability in the inifinite key limit
described in [11].
Scarani and Renner found that 1×106 raw
bits must be exchanged in order to get a posi-
tive key [22]. We define a system being usable
if we have a secure key rate above 14 bits/s
so that a positive key can be exchanged over
the course of an hour.
Note that in order to calculate the secure
key rate and two-fold coincidence rate per
second, the secure key bit and two-fold co-
incidence probabilities must be divided by
the experimentally defined coincidence win-
dow. The coincidence window is the maxi-
mum amount of time allowed to pass between
Alice and Bob’s detections in order for two
detections to be considered a coincidence.
1 our code is avaliable at:
http://qutip.blogspot.ca/2012/06/why-release-
your-source-code-and.html
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FIG. 1: Optimal two-fold coincidence proba-
bilities predicted by the model based on chan-
nel loss and detector noise factor. In this case,
da = db = 0. Dark count rates are only a linear
factor on the optimal two-fold coincidence rate.
Results
We found the squeezing parameter  that
maximized the secure key rate using Scipy
Optimize. We used this optimal  to cal-
culate two-fold coincidence probabilities and
secure key bit probabilities for 500,000 dif-
ferent combinations of the detector dark
count probability per coincidence window,
d = {0..0.1} and the channel efficiency, η =
{0..1}. These values and free parameters
were then provided to the symbolic regres-
sion tool Eureqa [23]. Symbolic regression
produces a predictive model from data com-
prized of arbitrary algebraic functions of the
input. Eureqa produced a model for two-fold
coincidence probability that maximized the
secure key rate:
Ptf = A
√
ηaηb +B(
√
ηaηb
3
sin (C −D√ηaηb − ηa − ηb)− da− db) +E
(1)
where A = 0.03579 , B = 0.23 , C = 1.162
, D = 2.496 , and E = −0.002444 , and ηa,
ηb, da, db are the channel efficiencies and the
background noises to Alice and Bob, respec-
tively. In order to determine the two-fold co-
incidence rate that this corresponds to, this
number must be divided by the coincidence
window. This model is plotted in figure 1 (for
the case when da = db = 0).
Experimental Verification
We verified the model by comparing the
simulated data and the model to experimen-
tal data. We used a Sagnac source of en-
tangled photons and passive basis choice po-
larization analyzers with Si-APDs for detec-
tion [25]. Our experimental apparatus is
demonstrated in fig. 3. We use passive mea-
surements, while our simulation uses post-
processing for active measurements, using
passive measurements should be the same
as active measurements if a post-processing
scheme where measurements with conflicting
results are discarded.
In typical operation, we used band-pass
filters to prevent the pump from entering
the detector modules and to minimize er-
rors due to dispersion. Typical operation also
involved shielding the source from overhead
light. Shielding the source reduced the dark
count rate, as did introducing band-pass fil-
ters, although the latter also reduced channel
efficiency.
In order to gather experimental data from
a wide variety of dark count rates and channel
efficiencies, we took experimental measure-
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FIG. 2: Estimation of SKR based on two-fold coincidence rates for different input power rates.
Three different experimental conditions were used: uncovered polarization analyzer without neutral
density filters (d = 1.976× 104, η = 0.25± 1× 10−2, graph A), covered polarization analyzers with
neutral density filters (d = 1.69 × 103, η = 0.085 ± 1 × 10−3, graph B), and after a free space
channel (d = 1.2× 103, η = 0.12± 1× 10−2, graph C). The coincidence windows for A and C were
3.5 ns, the coincidence window for B was 2.5 ns.
ments under three conditions: covered po-
larization analyzers with neutral density fil-
ters (d = 1.69 × 103, η = 0.085 ± 1 × 10−3),
uncovered polarization analyzer without neu-
tral density filters (d = 1.976 × 104, η =
0.25± 1× 10−2), and after a free space chan-
nel (d = 1.2× 103, η = 0.12± 1× 10−2). The
coincidence window for the first experiment
was 2.5 ns, for the second two experiments it
was 3.5 ns. In order to use the equation for
optimal two-folds, the dark count rate must
be scaled by the coincidence window.
Removing the band-pass filters reduced
the channel loss but introduced far more dark
counts. Adding neutral density filters par-
tially occluded the source’s output, decreas-
ing channel efficiency. Removing the shield-
ing of the Sagnac source increased the num-
ber of dark counts by a factor of 10.
The pump power was varied between 0
and 50 mW in increments of 5 mW. The
average coincidence rate and average QBER
were then used to estimate the SKR using
the asymptotic key rate. Results of these ex-
periments are presented in fig. 2. The upper
limit of the two-fold coincidences is limited
by the maximum power of the pump laser.
Fewer data points were collected on the noisy
channel due to the limitation of the memory
of the timetaggers not being able to handle
the coincidence rate.
It is not possible to directly measure µ
with existing experimental equipment, how-
ever, by comparing the empirically observed
counts of detection coincidences and the cal-
culated estimate of SKR to the corresponding
values produced by the simulation, we can
empirically validate the simulation.
5FIG. 3: While Alice received and correctly measured a horizontally polarized photon, Bob received
a mult-photon state and measured two orthogonal detectors clicking at the same time, leading to an
error. The entangled photon source (EPS) is a PPKTP crystal in a Sagnac configuration [24]. The
pump power was varied to observe the resulting coincidence rates and QBER. Loss was introduced
by adding neutral density filters or a free-space channel. Noise was introduced by exposing Alice
and Bob’s detectors to flourescent light. In this diagram, HWP: half-wave plate, BS: beam splitter,
NDA: neutral density filter, Alice, NDB: neutral density filter, Bob, BS: beam splitter, and PBS:
polarising beam splitter.
Discussion
From the experimental data and the nu-
merical solution, we can estimate the optimal
coincidence rate for the three channels, ex-
cept for the free space channel where our laser
power is insufficient to reach the coincidence
rate. For the channels with experimentally
determined optimal coincidence rates, the op-
timal determined from the numerical solution
is within the margin of error for the experi-
mental optimal. We now apply our model to
investigate two QKD channels.
Application: Optimizing QKD with
Satellites
We simulate loss and detector dark counts
in a satellite uplink scenario [26], meaning a
source on the ground with one photon going
to a LEO satellite while the other is mea-
sured on the ground, over a year of continu-
ous usage. The ground stations are located
on mountains (2.4 km above the ground)
and 45 km outside of Ottawa, Canada. The
ground telescopes had an aperture of 25 cm
and the satellite telescope had an aperture
of 20 cm. A low-earth-orbit satellite has a
period of 1.6 hours, and the values of loss
and dark counts are constantly changing as
the satellite passes from horizon to horizon in
the transmitter’s field of view.
Loss and detector dark counts are used
to calculate the optimal two-fold coincidence
rates. We then estimate the SKR using this
optimal two-fold coincidence rate, given de-
tectors with a quantum efficiency of 50% and
a dark count rate of 100 c/s (figure 5). We
also calculate the pair generation rate by us-
ing bucket detectors of unit efficiency at the
6Ground Station Site
Mountain (45 km) Mountain (20 km) Sea-Level (45 km) Sea-Level (20 km)
Total Key
Best Pass 322692 301849 88216 97812
75% Pass 183523 158257 44492 33010
50% Pass 26058 10294 2581 -
Additional Key
Best Pass 2383 3651 444 1106
75% Pass 4089 2676 507 1460
50% Pass 4681 6341 810 -
Percent Increase
Best Pass 0.74% 1.22% 0.46% 1.27%
75% Pass 2.65% 1.48% 1.15% 4.63%
50% Pass 21.90% 62.34% 45.75% -
TABLE I: Estimated additional key and total key generated by optimized variable two-fold coinci-
dence rate compared with a fixed coincidence rate. The conditions are: source and transmitter on
a mountain, or at sea-level, source and transmitter 20 km away from a city, source and transmitter
45 km away from Ottawa. There is no data for the median pass for a transmitter at sea-level
and 20 km from Ottawa because it is not possible to exchange a key under these conditions. The
median passes show the most improvement
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source. Passes are ordered by the length of
visible time between the transmitter and the
satellite. We compare this against the es-
timated SKR from the pair generation rate
fixed at a power that maximizes the secure
key rate over all passes. We assume a coinci-
dence window of 0.5 ns.
Adjusting the two-fold coincidence rate
dynamically does not improve the key rate
for good satellite passes (an increase of 0.75%
for the best link, and 2.65% during the course
of the 75th percentile link, for the transmit-
ter on 45 km from Ottawa on a mountain,
the best pass both in terms of background
counts and loss). The total key, additional
key and percent increase for a variety of sim-
ulations and passes are presented in table I.
Adjusting the source rate gives the biggest
increase for passes where the loss is worst or
the background counts increase. On the best
passes, the usable time of the satellite pass in-
creases by 10 s over the course of a 250 s pass.
On median pass, the usable time more than
doubles. This means that with optimization,
many more satellite passes which were previ-
ously infeasible due to the high loss are now
usable.
Application: Optimizing QKD with
Fiber Optics
We use the values reported for time reso-
lution, detector efficiency, and detector dark
counts for several types of detectors [27] to
compute loss budgets. The loss budget is
the largest loss, given an optimal pumping
rate, for which it is possible to transmit a
secure key of at least 50,000 bits [22] in a
given time period. For each detector, we
compute loss budgets for periods of one hour
and the asymptotic limit of time, including
loss from imperfect detectors. To obtain the
maximum loss permissible for a channel using
these detectors, we then subtract the detec-
tor ineffiencies from [27] off of the loss budget.
Our findings are summarized in table II.
Our estimates should be taken with a
caveat that they do not account for finite size
effects, which increase the QBER at very low
coincidence rates [22].
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9Dark Optical Fiber Implementations
The largest loss budget for a key in an
hour from table II is 22.4 dB at 1550 nm.
If we assume a continuous single mode fiber
channel link, no loss from other sources (such
as insertion loss), a fiber loss of 0.17 dB/km
[28], and symmetric links [29], the maximum
possible distance predicted for entanglement-
based QKD systems in fiber optic cables is
263.5 km. This number is calculated by di-
viding the loss budget by the loss per kilome-
ter and multiplying by two for the symmetric
links. In the asymptotic limit, this loss bud-
get goes up to 34.1 dB or 401.2 km.
Visible wavelengths suffer from much
higher losses in fiber, from 3 dB/km at
800 nm [30], to 30 dB/km at 515 nm [31].
Using the calculation above, this means that
the furthest a visible-wavelength implemen-
tation could travel in fiber is 16.3 km for a
key in an hour and 25.5 km for a key in the
asymptotic limit at 800 nm. Thus, although
visible light detectors have greater detection
efficiency and fewer dark counts, they are
less useful for long-distance fiber implemen-
tations due to the attenuation of visible light
in fiber.
Bright Optical Fiber Implementations
QKD with entanglement distribution has
been implemented on bright (carrying classi-
cal data) standard single-mode telecommuni-
cations fibers. This can be done by sending
the quantum information at an unused wave-
length in dense wavelength devision multi-
plexing protocols [32–34], or by using a wave-
length in the visible range, far from infrared
telecommunications wavelengths [35]. Us-
ing multiple close wavelengths on the same
fiber leads to wave-mixing processes, such
as stimulated brillouin scattering and four-
wave mixing [36]. Four-wave mixing pro-
cesses are a concern for experimentalists of
telecommunications systems, but are an ob-
stacle to QKD systems. QKD systems op-
erate at much lower optical powers than the
classical communications traffic (0.1-10 pW
compared to 0.1-100 mW), so it is more likely
for the classical channels to mix and spread
into the quantum channels than vice-versa.
The photons produced by wave-mixing pro-
cesses are generated in random bases, and
can be interpreted as detector dark counts
in analysis.
In simulation, we can determine the maxi-
mum ‘noise budget’ - meaning the maximum
dark count probability that can be tolerated
given a channel efficiency. We find that this
noise budget approximately follows a ratio-
nal equation, where in order to get a positive
key, the maximum tolerable dark count prob-
ability is:
d ≤ 0.0732ηaηb
ηa + ηb
(2)
where ηa and ηb are the channel efficiencies to
Alice and Bob, respectively. An experiment
could be optimized by following this limit.
For implementations with visible wave-
lengths, the impact of mixing and scattering
processes is negligible due to the wavelength
distance between classical and quantum sig-
nals. Therefore, systems on bright fibers with
visible wavelengths have the same maximum
distance as visibile wavelength implementa-
tions on dark fibers ( 16 km).
Conclusions
We have used realistic detector models
with correct treatment of double pairs to
determine the two-fold coincidence proba-
bility that would be measured in a given
entanglement-based QKD system when the
system has the largest secure key bit prob-
10
ability. We have used symbolic regression
to create an equation relating the optimal
two-fold coincidence probability to the de-
tector dark count probability and the system
loss. We have also taken experimental data
to show that our simulation matches reality
and that our model accurately indicates the
maximum under extreme experimental con-
ditions..
We hope that in finding this relation, we
have provided future experimentalists with a
useful tool. At the moment many demonstra-
tions of QKD with entangled photon pairs
rely on low numbers of coincidences where
the visibility is high [25, 35]. However, as de-
tectors and sources improve and experimen-
talists compete for the new distance record,
the issue of the tradeoffs between coincidence
rate and visibility will have to be adressed.
Our model provides a simple method for
maximizing the throughput of QKD systems,
which relies only on presently measurable
variables. We believe this model will al-
low for near real-time optimisation in pump
power in real-world implementations such as
on active telecommunications networks and
satellite transmission, where background and
losses change quickly and unpredictably. It
could also provide a starting point for future
theoretical exploration of this phenomenon.
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I. COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR
OPTIMAL µ AND MA’S OPTIMAL µ
In the appendix of Ma, Fung and Lo’s pa-
per on QKD with entangled photon sources,
they use their calculations for photon gain,
secure key rate in the asymptotic limit of
shared bits, and a model of loss and error
rates in order to determine the optimal value
for the photon pair production rate, µ. They
simplify for two cases, for a lossless channel
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FIG. 6: Comparison of our model for the optimal
µ to the numerical solution to µ found by Ma,
Fung and Lo [11]. ηm are the channels used by
Ma, Fung and Lo.
η = 1 and a very lossy channel η << 1. They
come up with an approximate relation which
must be numerically solved in order to de-
termine µ in terms of the intrinsic detector
error.
Our simulation differs from Ma’s equa-
tions in three ways. We use detector models
with poissonian distributions of dark counts.
We do post-processing to assign double clicks
to random bases, and we look at detector
dark counts, not detector error, which flips
the state of some incoming photons instead
of adding noise to the detection probability.
Although our model determines the optimal
measured two-fold coincidence rate, we cal-
culate the theoretical µ at the same time for
various detector dark counts and loss. Our
definitions of error are slightly different but
we believe that they are similar enough to al-
low for direct comparison between our model
and theirs, which we do in figure 6.
